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Abstract 26 
In the study of brain development, much research has focused on changes in 27 
executive function.  According to the Cognitive Complexity and Control (CCC) Theory, 28 
the development of executive function can be understood through specific “age-related 29 
changes in the maximum complexity of rules children can produce and use when solving 30 
problems.”  In order to evaluate these age-related changes, Philip Zelazo used the 31 
Dimensional Change Card Sort Task, which asks children ages 3-5 to sort a deck of 10 32 
cards into two target piles based on two given sets of rules.  The children are given a rule 33 
for sorting the first 5 cards of the deck; then a new rule is introduced for sorting the last 5 34 
cards.  The task evaluates the child’s ability to utilize executive control, inhibiting the 35 
first rule in favor of the second rule.  Typically, children ages 3-4 continue to sort by the 36 
first rule, even when this response is no longer appropriate, while 4-5 year olds 37 
successfully complete the task.  In traditional understandings of this task, children were 38 
asked to use rules focusing on dimensions, such as color, shape, and number.  However, 39 
our manipulation of the DCCS will use rules formed on the basis of discrete categories, 40 
specifically asking children to separate between cat versus dog and toy versus pet.  41 
Through this manipulation of Zelazo’s original study, we hope to investigate the CCC 42 
theory’s reliance on dimensions to describe levels of complexity in executive function 43 
development. 44 
45 
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Introduction 46 
In developmental literature, researchers have devoted much of their studies to 47 
learning and concept processing in children.  These studies have largely been concerned 48 
with the cognitive processes involved in learning and how these processes change over 49 
the course of normal development.   One particular cognitive process associated with 50 
learning that receives a large amount of attention is executive function. 51 
 There are several approaches to executive function in psychological literature.  52 
For example, authors Denckla and Reiss (1997) view executive function as a “cognitive 53 
module consisting of effector output elements involving inhibition, working memory, and 54 
organisational strategies necessary to prepare a response.”  This particular view of 55 
executive function references earlier authors, such as Baddeley, who theorized that 56 
working memory and executive function operate in terms of neural network models.  This 57 
concept of a neural network model can be explained as consisting of an input layer, a 58 
hidden layer, and an output layer.  For Baddeley and others, the input layer took in the 59 
perceptual components of an object.  Similarly, the hidden layer served to manipulate and 60 
decipher the components of the object.  Finally, the output layer of the neural network 61 
model was understood as a final stage of thought, typically involving a conclusive action 62 
or, in the case of a memory model, the encoding of a long term memory.  These neural 63 
network models were said to be operated by a central executive.  However, this definition 64 
suggests the existence of a homunculus, an entity contained within the brain which 65 
selects and controls higher order thought processes.  This explanation of executive 66 
function has proved ill-founded and slightly archaic, so that most recent research attempts 67 
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to avoid its use.  Neural network models also do not explain how executive function is 68 
accomplished, and thus make this approach particularly ineffective.  69 
 A second approach to executive function focuses on a structural representation of 70 
the cognitive process.  This approach relies on neuropsychological batteries to reveal the 71 
areas of the brain involved.  These tests serve to separate executive function into specific 72 
factors, such as inhibition and cognitive flexibility.  Researchers associate the appropriate 73 
use of each factor with an individual’s performance on a task.  This definition of 74 
executive function falsely implies that experimenters understand the cognitive processes 75 
underlying each of these factors.  On the contrary, they cannot agree on a name for each 76 
individual factor and its associated role in task performance.  This disagreement 77 
demonstrates this lack of knowledge on the subject.  For instance, Pennington (1997) 78 
describes the Wisconsin Card Sort Task as part of the “Set Shifting” factor, while Levin 79 
et al. (1991) describes the task as associated with “Perseveration and Disinhibition.”  In 80 
addition, one cannot demonstrate that the correlation between these factors and task 81 
performance can be attributed to a direct relation and does not include a variance due to 82 
shared methods.  These weaknesses make this approach similarly ineffective in 83 
addressing executive function.      84 
 One final view of executive function is that suggested by Luria (1973).  This 85 
approach considers executive function as a “functional construct,” focusing on the results 86 
rather than the mechanism itself.  Researchers make reference to the psychological 87 
processes involved, considering the individual’s representation of the problem, the 88 
selection of a plan to solve that problem, and the implementation of this plan.  In this 89 
approach, researchers do not seek to define executive function.  Rather, they prepare the 90 
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way for such definitions by examining well-established tests of executive function, 91 
clarifying the ways in which the various parts of executive function work together, and 92 
by avoiding understanding executive function as a homuncular ability. 93 
 This study does not concretely define executive function and the underlying 94 
psychological processes.  Rather, it will follow the functional construct approach 95 
described above.  This study will emphasize an understanding of executive function as 96 
the ability of children to maintain an appropriate problem-solving set, paying particular 97 
attention to their performance under specific circumstances (Pennington and Ozonoff, 98 
1996).  One way in which this study and several others accomplish this goal is through 99 
examining inflexibility.  Inflexibility has historically been understood as an impediment 100 
to problem solving, dating as far back as the Gestalt theorists of the 1940s.  These authors 101 
observed the rigidity with which subjects perceived and considered specific objects and 102 
situations, even after their approaches were no longer applicable.  In contemporary 103 
research, psychologists study inflexibility under a rubric of perseveration.  Perseveration 104 
serves to reveal underlying psychopathologies as well as damage to areas of the brain, 105 
particularly the prefrontal cortex.  Patients with prefrontal damage often perseverate on 106 
the Wisconsin Card Sort Task, a psychological test often used to evaluate cognitive 107 
flexibility.  In this task, participants are given four target cards, varying on the 108 
dimensions of color, shape, and number.  Participants must sort a deck of test cards into 109 
four piles, matching each one with one of the given target cards.  These participants are 110 
not informed of the rule; rather, they are told whether their match response is correct or 111 
incorrect.  After a certain number of correct answers, the experimenter changes the rule, 112 
again without the knowledge of the participant.  The participant must now discover what 113 
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this new sorting rule and then apply it to the remaining test cards.  Through this and other 114 
similar tasks, experimenters have found that inflexibility can occur both at the level of 115 
representation and at the level of response.  Here, representation can be understood as an 116 
internal cognitive symbol that stands for an external reality.  At the level of 117 
representation, researchers call this representational inflexibility, while at the level of 118 
response it is referred to as failures of response control.   119 
 In developmental literature, the different ages and different contexts in which 120 
perseveration occurs can be understood in terms of representational inflexibility and 121 
failures of response control.  For example, in a task developed by Piaget, infants make 122 
what he calls the A-not-B error.  The task involves hiding an object in location A and 123 
allowing the infant to search for it, which most children can successfully accomplish.  124 
However, when the experimenter moves the object to location B, hiding it so that most of 125 
the object is in plain view, the child will continue to search at location A for the object.  126 
Piaget would contest that the perseveration occurs due to errors at the level of 127 
representation, but a contemporary approach has suggested a failure of response control.  128 
This failure of response control describes the error as a product of the infant’s inability to 129 
inhibit the principal response.  Further studies in executive function with older infants 130 
demonstrate that children develop these problem-solving skill sets according to a 131 
standard timeline.  In a study done by DeLoache (1987), two-and-one-half and three year 132 
olds used a three dimensional model of a room to simulate the search for an object hidden 133 
in the room itself.  When performing this task, two-and-a-half year olds perseverated on 134 
earlier trial hiding places, while three year olds could correctly locate the hidden object in 135 
its new position.  According to DeLoache and colleagues, this task demonstrates age-136 
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Figure 1 
related changes in representational flexibility.  Two-and-one-half year olds only think of 137 
the room as a three dimensional object and cannot think of it as three year olds do, in 138 
terms of considering what it stands for. 139 
 Research regarding three and four year-olds further supports this idea of a developmental 140 
timeline for flexibility.  Studies have demonstrated that three year olds have difficulty switching 141 
between incompatible perspectives on a specific object or set of objects.  In other words, when a 142 
three year old is presented with conflicting information regarding the object, he or she will 143 
perseverate on the salient pieces of information and will be unable to substitute in the alternate 144 
set of facts.  Four year olds, however, can analyze an object from these two separate viewpoints, 145 
moving easily from one representation to the next.  Researchers have yet to determine how to 146 
best interpret these age-related changes in flexibility, but the use of a rubric for executive 147 
function in the study of these changes seems to be gaining more weight.  One largely accepted 148 
method of studying executive function in relation to these increases in flexibility is the 149 
Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS).  In this task, children are presented with cards that vary 150 
along two dimensions (e.g., shape and color).  They are given two target cards (e.g., a blue rabbit 151 
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and a red boat) and asked to sort a deck of ten cards varying upon the two previously mentioned 152 
dimensions (e.g., red rabbits and blue boats, Figure 1).  Experimenters provide the rules by 153 
which children must sort these cards, asking them to sort the cards first by one dimension and 154 
then by the other.  Traditionally, children sort five cards in the “pre-switch,” which describes the 155 
trials prior to the introduction of a new rule.  Experimenters then inform children of this new 156 
rule, by which they must sort the five remaining cards in what is called the “post-switch.”  157 
Despite which dimension they are presented with first, three-to-four year olds perseverate along 158 
the first dimension in post-switch trials, demonstrating inflexibility in their representation of the 159 
cards.  Even when reminded of the new rule for each trial, these children still perseverate.  Four-160 
to-five year olds, however, successfully utilize the new rule for the sorting of the remaining 161 
cards.   162 
The DCCS has been proven reliable in its strong correlation with other measures 163 
of executive function, and the age-related changes seen in children’s performance on the 164 
task demonstrate that executive function undergoes rapid development between the ages 165 
of three and five.  Several theories have been developed to explain these sudden changes.  166 
Morton and Munakata (2002) suggest a neural network model that explains the age-167 
related changes on the DCCS in terms of accounts of memory.  Specifically, these 168 
authors construct a model for the DCCS involving three layers of processing units: a 169 
layer of input units, a layer of hidden units, and a layer of output units.  The layer of input 170 
units incorporates the test cards, the instructions for sorting these cards, and the relevant 171 
dimension for sorting.  The hidden layer refers to a representation of the test cards and 172 
other pieces of information.  The output layer corresponds to the target cards to which 173 
children match the test cards.  Morton and Munakata discuss the effect of active versus 174 
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latent memory traces on this model.  Active memory traces are described under this 175 
model as sustained activity of particular processing units, while latent memory traces are 176 
described as being formed by changes in the strength of connections between processing 177 
units.  In the brain, active memory traces are formed in the prefrontal cortex, while latent 178 
memory traces are formed in the posterior cortex.  These latent memory traces are not 179 
accessible to other areas of the brain because of their implicit formation as changes in the 180 
strength of connections between processing units; however, these latent traces influence 181 
the activation of stimuli and, thus, affect the subsequent processing of these stimuli in 182 
other brain areas.  Perseveration on the DCCS, as explained by this theory, occurs when 183 
an active memory trace for newly relevant information cannot compete for cognitive 184 
attention against a latent memory trace from the previously relevant input.  In other 185 
words, if children must first sort according to color, this active memory trace will be 186 
maintained in the prefrontal cortex, and the increased strength of this connection will 187 
form a latent memory trace.  Upon the post-switch, the active memory trace of the new 188 
relevant rule dimension, shape, must prove strong enough to overcome the latent memory 189 
traces connected to the previously relevant dimension, color.  Activation strength of the 190 
new dimension in comparison to the latent memory trace depends on the development of 191 
the prefrontal cortex.  A fully developed prefrontal cortex can effectively sustain 192 
activation of the relevant dimension, thus allowing for a switch in the representation of 193 
the target cards via the change in rule and dimension at the input processing level.   194 
Other researchers have attributed the age-related differences in performance on 195 
the DCCS to the development of inhibition.  According to a great deal of 196 
neuropsychological literature, the growth of inhibition parallels the growth of the 197 
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prefrontal cortex.  Thus, a more developed prefrontal cortex corresponds to a more 198 
effective use of the mental process of inhibition.  One can see issues with inhibition at the 199 
level of response control, seeing a failure to suppress an overlearned response tendency.  200 
Here, overlearning refers to the repeated emphasis of a concept, so as to make a particular 201 
response or course of action become automatic.  Carlson and Moses (2001), along with 202 
Perner and colleagues (1999), believe that three-to-four-year-olds acquire a prepotent 203 
response tendency or action schema during the preswitch of the DCCS.  Carlson and 204 
Moses emphasize that perseveration does not occur due to problems with conflicting 205 
representations; rather, it occurs due to issues at the level of attention.  In order to 206 
respond correctly to the rule switch in the post-switch of the DCCS, children must utilize 207 
executive inhibition.  They must shift their attention by inhibiting the previously correct 208 
sorting rule in favor of a new sorting rule.  Because three-to-four-years old are not as far 209 
along in their development of the prefrontal cortex, they will perform poorly on the post-210 
switch of the DCCS. Four-to-five year olds, however, demonstrate the ability to shift 211 
attention to a new rule through their performance on the DCCS.  This is due to a greater 212 
development of the prefrontal cortex in this age group.  Thus, performance on the DCCS 213 
can be explained via inhibition and its development in connection with the prefrontal 214 
cortex.   215 
One final set of theories of executive function in relation to the DCCS centers on 216 
the complexity of processing that children are capable of.  Halford and colleagues 217 
hypothesized age-related differences in executive function stem from differences in 218 
experience.  More experience supposedly correlates with a better understanding, which 219 
causes differences in executive function across ages.  In addition, Halford hypothesized 220 
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that the complexity of rules which children understand depends on their ability to process 221 
multiple items in parallel with one another.  Research has introduced a different theory of 222 
increases in complexity called the Cognitive Control and Complexity Theory (CCC 223 
Theory).  This particular theory understands these age-related changes in complexity in 224 
terms of a child’s ability to formulate a hierarchical system of rules.  The older and more 225 
experienced the child, the more complex the rule system they create.  The CCC theory 226 
explains that children perseverate when they cannot integrate two incompatible 227 
representations into a larger rule system.  Once the child formats a higher order rule to 228 
govern these two conflicting conceptions, they can use both in the same task.  With 229 
regard to DCCS, three-to-four year olds cannot consider both color and shape when 230 
examining test cards until they have created a rule system that integrates the two 231 
dimensions.  Four-to-five year olds, however, prove perfectly capable of using a higher 232 
order principle for organizing these dimensions. 233 
The main concern of this study is the reliance of CCC theory, and several others, 234 
on the concept of dimensions.  For the purposes of this study, one can define dimensions 235 
as perceptual categories, specifically color, shape, and number.  Children who perform 236 
well on the DCCS have constructed a rule system that integrates several different 237 
dimensions.  This rule system allows them to consider each dimension, selecting the one 238 
that fits the current setting conditions.  In this study, we will replace these dimensions 239 
with more discrete categories used for labeling objects.  Specifically, three-to-five year 240 
olds will evaluate pictures of cats and dogs by sorting them into the categories cats and 241 
dogs, and then into the categories of live animals (“pets”) or stuffed animals (“toys.”)  If 242 
children continue to demonstrate differences across age groups in their ability to sort 243 
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these images, this would demonstrate that complexity does not depend solely on 244 
dimensions but can be extended to other relevant categories used for sorting. 2603 245 
 246 
EXPERIMENT 1 247 
Methods 248 
Participants. Participants in this study were three to four years of age (n= 28) and four 249 
to five years of age (n=36).  Participants were recruited from daycares and preschools in 250 
the Greater Columbus Area.  Recruitment and testing procedures were in accordance with 251 
a human subject protection protocol.  Written parental consent and verbal consent from 252 
each participant was obtained.   253 
Materials. Images of real cats, toy cats, real dogs, and toy dogs measuring 2.5 by 3 254 
inches on each side were used.  These images appeared on a laptop computer screen 255 
using the computer software program Superlab, with two target images in the top row and 256 
one test image in the bottom row.  257 
Procedure. Testing took place in quiet locations in the preschools and daycares.  All 258 
children were tested individually in 10 to 15 minute sessions using a laptop computer to 259 
administer the task via Superlab software.  Once participants were seated in front of the 260 
computer and ready to begin, a set of rules was explained to them.  The procedure 261 
followed the standard version of the Dimensional Change Card Sort as detailed by Frye, 262 
Zelazo, and Palfai (1995), with some slight modifications to allow for administration on a 263 
laptop computer.  In the standard version, two images or cards chosen from the sorting 264 
categories (e.g., blue boat and red rabbit) are used as targets.  The child is then presented 265 
with ten test cards (e.g., red boats and blue rabbits) one at a time and ask them to sort 266 
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Figure 2 
these cards into to piles on the target cards.  The task begins with one rule (e.g., sort by 267 
shape) used to sort five of the test cards, and then switches to a second (e.g., sort by 268 
color) to sort the remaining five test cards.  Experimenters repeat the sorting rule upon 269 
each new trial.  270 
 In this particular experiment, two example images were chosen from the two 271 
categories by which children would be sorting.  For example, children were presented 272 
with a pet cat and a toy dog as target stimuli.  These two target images appeared toward 273 
the upper corners of the computer screen, while the image to be sorted appeared in the 274 
middle toward the bottom of the screen (Figure 2).  The first set of rules for sorting is 275 
introduced after the child was settled and ready to begin (e.g., toys go here, pets go here).  276 
The experiment included an orientation slide to illustrate the layout of each subsequent 277 
slide.  After the first set of rules is introduced, two practice trials are administered.  In 278 
these practice trials, the participant received an explanation of the rules.  For the toy and 279 
pet rule, children were told: “A toy is not a real animal.  So if you have a toy dog or a toy 280 
bear, those are not real animals.  But a pet is a real animal, so if you have a pet bird or a 281 
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pet hamster, those are real animals.”  Experimenters would then indicate the real cat, 282 
saying, “This is a pet because it is a real animal.”  Experimenters would then indicate the 283 
stuffed animal dog, saying, “This is a toy because it is not a real animal.”  After these 284 
rules had been established, the experimenter would let the child sort two images as 285 
practice, giving no feedback as to whether the response was correct or incorrect.  Then 286 
the participant began sorting the test trial images.  The child was reminded of the rule set 287 
and asked to respond as quickly as possible. The participant then began the five recorded 288 
experimental trials.  For each of the five recorded trials, the experimenter repeated the 289 
sorting rule, saying, “Toys go here, and pets go here.  Where does the picture on the 290 
bottom go?” or “Dogs go here, and cats go here.  Where does the picture on the bottom 291 
go?”  After the child had seen five slides in this fashion, the experimenter introduced the 292 
new set of rules (e.g., cats go here, dogs go here).  In the same way as for the first set, the 293 
experimenter administered two practice trials, reminded the child of the rule set, asked 294 
the child to answer as quickly as possible, and then administered the five remaining 295 
recorded trials.  Once again, the child was reminded of the sorting rule for each trial.  In 296 
coding the child’s responses, the experimenter pressed the 1 key when the child indicated 297 
the target stimulus on the left side of the screen, and he or she pressed the 0 key when the 298 
child indicated the stimulus on the right-hand side of the screen. 299 
 The experiment included two different conditions.  The first condition had the cat 300 
and dog rule (i.e., cats go here, dogs go here) in the pre-switch and the toy and pet rule 301 
(i.e., toys go here, pets go here) in the post-switch.  In other words, children were asked 302 
to sort by the cat and dog rule first, for the first five test stimuli, and then asked children 303 
to sort the remaining five test stimuli by the toy and pet rule.  The second condition 304 
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Figure 3 
reversed the order of rules, with the toy and pet rule first in the pre-switch and the cat and 305 
dog rule following in the post-switch. 306 
Results 307 
 In order to understand the predicted results for this study, one must first 308 
understand which data to consider.  The original Dimensional Change Card Sort study 309 
(Frye, Zelazo, and Palfai, 1995) focused specifically on the mean score in the post-switch 310 
for each age group.  Here, the score equates to the number of correct responses out of the 311 
total number of trials.  For example, three out of five correctly sorted test images would 312 
earn a child a 60% score.  A score of 80% correct was considered passing, while anything 313 
below this was considered failing.  Frye’s original study only considered the post-switch 314 
score for those children who obtained an 80% or better on the pre-switch trials.  This 315 
approach functions to establish a child’s ability to successfully perform the task.  In the 316 
results from the original study, three year-olds scored significantly lower on the post-317 
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Figure 4 
Figure 5 
switch than four year-olds.  In this our study, we predicted that one would see the same 318 
effects.  319 
 In experiment 1, one saw the predicted effects for the first condition.  In other 320 
words, when the toy and pet rule was used in the post-switch, three year olds did worse in 321 
sorting test images than four year olds (Figure 3).  This result was significant, F(1, 28) = 322 
25.38, p< 0.05, suggesting that the age-related differences in executive function can apply 323 
to 324 
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children’s use of discrete categories as well as dimensions.  However, in the second 325 
condition of experiment 1, the difference between three and four year olds was not 326 
significant.  Both age groups did surprisingly well on the post-switch phase for condition.  327 
Furthermore, when examining all participants, half of the sample could not use the toy 328 
and pet rule properly when it occurred in the pre-switch.  Four year olds, according to the 329 
original DCCS study, should understand the sorting concepts and perform the pre-switch 330 
trials without any notable problems.  However, using the toy and pet rule in the pre-331 
switch seemed to present additional problems outside the scope of the predictions.  Thus, 332 
it became necessary to examine differences in use between rules within the age groups.  333 
Specifically, when examining three year olds’ use of the toy and pet rule versus the cat 334 
and dog rule within the pre-switch (Figure 4), one saw a significant difference, F(1, 28) 335 
=7.111, p< 0.05.  Similarly, one saw a significant difference between rules for 3-year-336 
olds in the post-switch, F (1, 28) = 62.60.  From these results, one can see that, regardless 337 
of whether the rules were in pre-switch or post-switch, three year olds used the cat and 338 
dog rule much more effectively than the toy and pet rule.  For four year olds, one saw 339 
similar effects (Figure 5), with differences in rule use being significant in the pre-switch, 340 
F (1, 36) = 6.998, p< 0.05, and in the post-switch, F (1, 36) = 7.778, p, 0.05.  We 341 
formatted experiment 2 in hopes of elucidating these differences in rule use.  342 
 343 
EXPERIMENT 2 344 
Methods 345 
Participants. Participants in this study were three to four years of age (n= 18) and four 346 
to five years of age (n=15).  Participants were recruited from daycares and preschools in 347 
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Figure 6 
 
the Greater Columbus Area.  Recruitment and testing procedures received ethical 348 
approval.  Written parental consent was obtained. 349 
Materials. Images of real cats, toy cats, real dogs, and toy dogs measuring 2.5 by 3 350 
inches on each side were used.  These images appeared on a laptop computer screen 351 
using the computer software program Superlab, with two target images in the top row and 352 
one test image in the bottom row, as in the first experiment.  In addition, this experiment 353 
included slides with the same images that participants sorted in the middle of each page. 354 
Procedure. The procedure for this experiment followed the procedure for experiment 355 
1 with one additional task.  After participants had sorted the ten test images by the 356 
preswitch and postswitch rules, they were presented with the same ten test stimuli (e.g., 357 
Figure 6) without any target images and asked to categorize these images as either toy or  358 
pet.  359 
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Figure 7 
Results 360 
 Experiment 2 returned similar results in terms of age-related differences in post-361 
switch performance for each condition.  In considering performance on the familiarity 362 
task in conjunction with DCCS performance, one should examine participants’ accuracy 363 
on the DCCS when using the toy pet rule against their accuracy on the familiarity task 364 
(Figure 7).  For three year olds who failed to use the toy pet rule correctly, this 365 
comparison of accuracy scores proved significant, t (9) = 8.072.  This suggested that, 366 
while three year olds understood the distinction between toys and pets, they were not able 367 
to apply this understanding to a sorting rule.  This comparison in four year olds who 368 
failed to use the toy pet rule correctly also proved significant, t (6) = 5.280.  This 369 
similarly demonstrates that four year olds understand the distinction between toys and 370 
pets but were unable to utilize this distinction for the purpose of sorting test images.  371 
Discussion 372 
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 In the first experiment, one only saw age-related differences in the first condition 373 
and not in the second condition.  This meant that three year olds did worse than four year 374 
olds in sorting test images when the toy and pet rule was in the post-switch, but not when 375 
the cat and dog rule was in the post-switch.  Upon further inspection, it was seen that a 376 
significant difference in the participants’ ability to correctly use the cat and dog rule 377 
versus the toy and pet rule.  This difference between rules was seen for both three year 378 
olds and four year olds, showing that one could not attribute this difference to age-related 379 
changes in the development of executive function.  From these analyses, one can also see 380 
that this difference in accuracy scores for each rule exists regardless of pre-switch or 381 
post-switch.  Furthermore, in the second condition, when the toy and pet rule was in the 382 
pre-switch, approximately half of the participants did not utilize this rule correctly and 383 
thus were not able to achieve a passing score.  In response to this, one might attribute the 384 
inability of both three and four year olds to correctly use the toy and pet rule to a lack of 385 
understanding of the distinction between toys and pets.  In order to demonstrate this 386 
claim as false, children were administered a familiarity task in experiment 2.  High scores 387 
on this task demonstrate that preschoolers do understand the labels of toy and pet.  388 
However, their accuracy in sorting by these dimensions suggests that they cannot 389 
correctly apply this knowledge.   390 
The next question one may ask is: what else could explain this difference between 391 
children’s understanding of specific labels and their ability to apply these labels?  First, 392 
one must understand categorization, specifically the increases in sophistication of labels 393 
that children can use.  According to the work done by Eleanor Rosch (1976), humans 394 
categorize objects at two different levels: a basic and a superordinate level.  The basic 395 
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level of taxonomy focuses on the physical attributes of the object, and all other objects in 396 
the same category have several perceptual similarities.  Objects at the superordinate level, 397 
however, do not share as many perceptual similarities.  A superordinate category is one 398 
level more abstract than the basic level category, and objects are grouped into these 399 
classes because the weight of their similarities is greater than the weight of their 400 
distinctive features.  For example, chair, lamp, and dresser all constitute basic level 401 
categories, and those objects that share perceptual similarities with each of these objects 402 
fall into that basic category.  These objects also all fall into the superordinate category of 403 
furniture.  While the similarities at this level might not be as striking, they outweigh the 404 
dissimilarities between these objects, and they do not share any perceptual similarities 405 
with objects in another superordinate category, such as vehicles.   406 
 In the case of this study, cat and dog can be considered basic level categories, 407 
while toy and pet would be considered superordinate level categories.  Thus, in a 408 
hierarchical understanding, the basic level categories of cat and dog fall under the 409 
superordinate labels of toy and pet.  Further research done by Marjorie Horton and Ellen 410 
Markman (1980) demonstrates that there may be developmental differences in the 411 
acquisition of hierarchical categorization abilities.  She and her colleagues hypothesized 412 
that basic level categories are acquired first, followed by superordinate level categories.  413 
This may explain why participants in this study could easily label images as cat and dog 414 
but had more difficulty labeling them as toy and pet.  In other words, these preschoolers 415 
have not yet developed the ability to consider the test images as members of both basic 416 
level groups and of superordinate level groups. 417 
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 One other possible explanation for this difference in three and four year olds is 418 
Morton and Munakata’s theory of latent versus active memory traces.  This theory would 419 
suggest that, once the child had begun working with the cat and dog rule, this created 420 
very strong latent memory traces.  In addition, the active memory trace of the toy and pet 421 
rule would not have been nearly strong enough to overcome the latent memory traces of 422 
the cat and dog rule.  The strength of a child’s experience with the labels of cat and dog 423 
versus toy and pet may have also influenced this difference in memory trace strength.  424 
Specifically, the labels of cat and dog can be considered overlearned in that children 425 
encounter these labels much more frequently and in direct comparison with one another 426 
when compared with the labels of toy and pet.  The term “overlearned” also refers to the 427 
repeated teaching of a concept to a child even after he or she has demonstrated 428 
understanding of that concept.  These overlearned labels of cat and dog would create 429 
stronger latent memory traces, which would make it even more difficult for the weak 430 
active memory trace of toy and pet to compete for more activation.  Thus, when 431 
preschoolers already lack the executive control necessary to switch between activations 432 
of object representations, the effect of overlearned material serves to make this change 433 
even more difficult.  434 
Conclusion 435 
 This study began with the objective of providing evidence against the assumption 436 
that dimensions govern a child’s ability to create a hierarchical rule structure.  By 437 
forming rules upon discrete categories instead of dimensions, experimenters hoped to see 438 
the same perseveration effects so as to prove this assumption of the CCC theory to be 439 
false.  However, the results showed support for a different, previously unconsidered 440 
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hypothesis: children perseverate on overlearned, basic-level labels rather than switching 441 
to superordinate level labels.  This can be attributed to age-related differences in a child’s 442 
ability to utilize these superordinate-level labels.  The results demonstrate that three-to-443 
four year olds understand the labels they were using.  However, they are unable to inhibit 444 
the prepotent tendency to use a more familiar, basic-level term in favor of the 445 
superordinate-level term.  Research by Horton and Markman (1980) has already 446 
demonstrated the possibility of age-related differences in children’s ability to use 447 
superordinate rules.  This study produces further evidence to support this claim.  It also 448 
suggests that this inability to use superordinate labels before a certain age can be 449 
understood in terms of inflexibility.  Participants in this task perseverated on the basic 450 
level labels, although they demonstrated knowledge of superordinate level labels. This 451 
demonstrates their inability to switch between a representation of target images in both 452 
basic and superordinate level categories.   Further research must be conducted to ensure 453 
that three-to-four year olds are capable of categorizing using these superordinate labels of 454 
toy and pet.  Also, the target images used for sorting test images must not have any 455 
conflict contained within them.  In other words, one of the original test images was both a 456 
dog and a toy.  Thus, children had trouble inhibiting the more strongly activated features 457 
of the image (i.e., its dog features) in favor of the less obvious superordinate toy features.  458 
Also, further research will demonstrate that, when unprompted, children will categorize 459 
the test images used in the original experiment as cats and dogs and almost never as toys 460 
and pets.  Thus, this study clearly demonstrates a difference between the labels that a 461 
child understands and what they can apply to a rule system, and this may be influenced 462 
by the level of sophistication used to apply that label.  463 
464 
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